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Abstract
Presented as providing cost-, time- and labour- effective tools for the (self)management of health, health apps are often
celebrated as beneficial to all. However, their negative effects – commodification of user data and infringement on privacy –
are rarely addressed. This article focuses on one particularly troubling aspect: the difficulty of opting out of data sharing
and aggregation during app use or after unsubscribing/uninstalling the app. Working in the context of the new European
General Data Protection Regulation and its implementation in the UK health services, our analysis reveals the discrepancy
between the information presented to users, and the apps’ actual handling of user data. We also point to the fundamental
tension in the digitisation of health, between the neoliberal model where both health and data concerns are viewed as an
individual’s responsibility, and the digital-capitalist model, which puts forward, and capitalises on, collective (‘Big’) data.
Pulled between the ‘biopolitics of the self’ and the ‘biopolitics of the population’ (concepts coined by Btihaj Ajana), opting
out of health datafication therefore cannot be resolved as a matter of individual right alone. The article offers two
contributions. Methodologically, we present a toolkit for a multi-level assessment of apps from the perspective of opting
out, which can be adapted and used in future research. Conceptually, the article brings together critical digital health
scholarship with the perspective of data justice, offering a new approach to health apps, which focuses on opt-out as a
legal, social and technical possibility, and as a collective citizen and user right.
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Introduction
‘There’s an App for that!’ A catchy Internet phrase of
mid 2000s, initiated and subsequently trademarked by
Apple, captures what has become an everyday reality
for most digital economies. With the widespread use of
smartphones, we are increasingly reliant on apps that
are either pre-loaded or can be voluntarily/casually and
mandatorily/professionally downloaded, to manage all
areas of our consumer, work, political and personal
lives. The sheer volume, range, speed and breadth of
different types of apps available in the market today
demonstrate how this all-encompassing ‘appisation’ is
now an inevitable part of contemporary digital life.1–3
It is impossible to talk about digital health today with-
out referring to appisation (or ‘mHealth’/‘mobile
Health’ as the process is more commonly described in
medical circles). According to Satista, ‘The health and
medical industry have been named as one of the top
three fields to accelerate the growth of mobile devices’.4
At present, countless apps are being developed and
offered to individual smartphone users to manage
healthy lifestyles or to support specific medical and
health conditions; the apps are also extensively inte-
grated into public and private health service provi-
sions.5,6 However, the invisible yet detrimental
by-products of health appisation – such as infringe-
ments on privacy, data monetisation and long-term
digital profiling – are rarely understood by the medical
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practitioners and health service providers advocating
for the apps. Nor are these always clear to the users,
lured by the speed and convenience of ‘on demand
healthcare’, usually advertised as an ‘affordable and
accessible service at one’s fingertips’ (to use the words
of Babylon Health, one of the leading health apps).7
Health appisation is thus presented as an unquestion-
ably positive process, devoid of dangers and beneficial
to all – a celebratory framing that both conceals and
supports the apps’ data economy of ‘surveillance cap-
italism’ 8–11 that relies on users’ willing but often
unknowing participation and continuous personal
‘contribution’ of their data.
While health appisation may indeed have revolu-
tionised some aspects of healthcare, its broader and
often perturbing socio-political effects are yet to be
explored in the academic domain of digital health.
Deborah Lupton5 recently argued that most studies
on health apps to date come from medical or public
health literature, which focuses primarily on an instru-
mental approach to apps’ effectiveness or medical
validity. What is yet to be interrogated are ‘[t]he
wider social, cultural and political roles played by
health and medical apps as part of contemporary
healthcare and public health practice’5 (p. 607) – a
task she sets out for ‘critical digital health studies’.
In this article, we want to push Lupton’s idea of the
critical digital health framework further. We want to
challenge some assumptions surrounding the status
quo of health app studies by exploring one specific
and particularly disturbing aspect of health appisation:
not only the surrender of one’s health data, but more
worryingly, that once the data is integrated into the
apps, there is very little room for opting out. In that
respect, we approach health apps not just as what
Lupton calls ‘socio-cultural artefacts’, but as ‘socio-cul-
tural data traps’, elaborate and sophisticated in their
technologies of incorporation and engagement, yet
incredibly scarce in social affordances and technical
mechanisms for letting go of their ‘data subjects’.
Therefore, the central concern of our article is the
question of opt-out as a legal, social and technical pos-
sibility, and as a citizen and user right. Our approach
aligns with the emerging body of scholarship on ‘data
justice’,12–15 which, as Linnet Taylor formulates,
should include ‘the freedom not to use particular
technologies, and in particular not to become part of
commercial databases as a by-product of development
interventions’14 (p. 9). Taylor’s framework of data
justice was developed when looking at international
development, humanitarian intervention, refugee
border crossing and population surveillance – in
other words, in contexts of precarity and systemic vul-
nerability, where power and governance increasingly
rely on digital data, and where all-encompassing digital
surveillance often manifests as a necessary ‘care’. The
leap from here to digital health might seem far-fetched;
however we argue that it is precisely the double-bound
nature of care versus surveillance that makes the per-
spective of data justice crucial for critical digital health
studies. Because of the intimate relationship between
personal health and personal data, which the process
of appisation transforms, questions of opting out are of
particular urgency to the field of digital health, extend-
ing far beyond the domain of the theoretical. In the
context of data economies and the continuously
increasing appisation of healthcare, these questions
are also acute for the general public, medical research
bodies and care providers, including private enterprises
and national health services. In our discussion,
we focus less on the pressure that medical systems
put on some patients to use technology as part of
their care (for example, apps developed for specific
medical conditions). In other words, we are not
addressing individual autonomy over choices in medi-
cal treatment and management. Rather, our focus is
more on the use of health apps generally, understood
through the lens of one’s rights to one’s data, beyond
the context of medical treatment.
Combining our expertise in digital sociology, cultur-
al studies, digital health, computation and data visual-
isation, this article aims to make two key contributions
to simultaneously advance critical debates in the field
of ‘critical digital health studies’ and to inform future
research around digitised healthcare. The first contri-
bution lies in our proposed paradigmatic shift from
engagement to dis-engagement as a starting point for
discussing health appisation (for a broader discussion
of ‘digital disengagement’ as a shift in media studies,
see Kuntsman and Miyake16). Current research into
digital health, including critical scholarship,5,17–20 still
largely prioritises engagement with digital technologies.
Because digital engagement provides access to social
networks and health e-resources for individuals, sup-
port groups, carers and practitioners, the aim of digital
health seems to be – like all other sectors – to make
citizen engagement and the digital inseparable from
one another. Within such a framework, disengagement
is envisioned only as an aberration, or an afterthought
to be remedied through more tests and trials to increase
engagement. Such a configuration makes questions of
‘data traps’ and opting out difficult to address beyond
instrumental questions of how ‘data management’
or ‘privacy protection’ can be improved. Using the
disengagement paradigm, we call instead to place the
discussion of legal, social and technical possibilities to
opt out at the centre of the work on health appisation,
bringing critical digital health scholarship into much
needed conversation within the field of data justice.
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Our second contribution is a toolkit for multi-level
evaluation of the apps themselves. The evaluation pro-
cess we propose – which is outlined in more detail in
the next section – resembles the ‘app walk through’
method, developed by Light et al., where a critical
study of the app involves ‘systematically and forensi-
cally step[ping] through the various stages of app reg-
istration and entry, everyday use and discontinuation
of use’21 (p. 881). Yet the uniqueness of our toolkit is
that it is grounded in the paradigm of digital disengage-
ment, and as such, differs fundamentally from most
methodological approaches to the study of health
apps. A substantial portion of current health app stud-
ies comes from the abovementioned tendency to nor-
malise engagement, thus mostly investing resources
into how the apps work or how they can be improved
– whether through app development or changes in user
experience.22,23 By challenging the norm of digital
engagement and by exposing the risks and the traps –
rather than the promise and the potential – of health
apps, we are laying a path for future research that
can productively challenge the ways in which digital
technologies are often embraced too quickly and
without sustained critical consideration. Our toolkit is
thus intended for wider use and it is hoped will benefit
academic researchers, health app developers and test-
ers, as well as health practitioners and of course the
users themselves.
Context and methods
In this article, we take the UK as a case study to devel-
op and test our toolkit, while also demonstrating the
applicability of our framework more broadly. In con-
sidering the current socio-legal landscape of digital
health and opting out in the UK, we reveal how local-
ised processes regarding opt-out are simultaneously a
reflection of nation-specific legal and economic condi-
tions and of global concerns, especially as those are
understood within the context of Big Data, the algo-
rithmic value of appisation, and the shared practices
between multinational corporations and services,
benefiting from the circulation of personal data
around the world. Within such a formulation,
it becomes even more pertinent to find more ways to
understand the question of opting out at the level
of social norms, legal rights, technical opportunities
and everyday praxis.
Between the global data economy and the national/
regional data rights
As in many other digital economies, the health sector in
the UK is increasingly expecting patients to manage
their own health and wellbeing through apps.
As such, health apps are widely offered by private com-
panies and the public sector, including the National
Health Service (NHS) and especially NHS Digital, ‘the
national information and technology partner to the
health and care system’.24 The incorporation of apps
into NHS Digital is the latest development in the
longer tradition of phone and online patient support,
designed to reduce the workload of general practitioners
(GPs) and hospitals, and in this sense, it should be
understood within a broader context of continuous
budget cuts leading to diminishing resources for face-
to-face and on-site patient support. At the same time,
such developments are also part of the general move
towards ‘self-responsibilisation’ for one’s health25,26
within the wider Euro–American neoliberal context.
At the time of our study in 2018, two major legal
developments took place, pivotal for understanding the
current opt-out landscape in the UK. Firstly, the
European General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) came into force in May 2018 and was fully
adopted in the UK (despite the uncertainty surround-
ing the process of Brexit). Unlike the earlier UK Data
Protection Law, GDPR moves towards a legal frame-
work that defaults to opt-out rather than opt in.
The GDPR’s overall aim is to increase people’s control
over their own personal data and ‘to protect all EU
citizens from privacy and data breaches in an increas-
ingly data-driven world’.27 For companies and organ-
isations this means obtaining consent for using and
retaining customers’ personal data; for the ‘data sub-
ject’, it grants more rights to be informed and control
how their personal data is used. Secondly and related,
in May 2018, NHS Digital launched its national
data opt out service in line with GDPR guidelines,
aimed to provide ‘a facility for individuals to opt out
from the use of their data for research or plan-
ning purposes.’28
While opt-out rights are at the heart of GDPR,
health apps used in the UK are also part of the
global capitalist data economy where such rights are
diminishing. How then can we understand a
European data protection law and (the limits of) its
power in the context of global digital platforms and
app companies, not to mention their (equally global)
data aggregation? Similarly, what are the impacts and
the limits of the NHS policies regarding opt-out, when
they actively collaborate with private, commercial,
third-party app providers who may abide by different
corporate rules? Lastly and most pressingly, how is this
complex and at times contradictory information com-
municated to the current or potential app users, or
healthcare providers? These questions, arising from
the digital–legal context of appisation in the UK, con-
sequently informed the design and execution of
our research.
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NHS Digital: safety, trustworthiness, confusion
When we began working on our project, NHS Digital
was gradually developing GDPR compliance by updat-
ing information and editing its pages, among them, the
NHS Apps Library. Launched pre-GDPR in April
2017 to offer ‘Trusted digital tools for patients and
the public to manage and improve their health’
(emphasis added by authors),29 it moved to a new,
temporary Beta version at the time of our research.
This NHS Apps Library offers an ‘NHS badge’: a
tick that appears next to a given app as a sign that it
has undergone the process of ‘Vetting Apps’,30 result-
ing in apps having either the ‘NHS Approved’ or the
‘Being Tested in the NHS’ badge, respectively. Situated
within the online NHS environment, the Library is thus
a place where a user/patient can assume the apps
offered are indeed to be ‘trusted’ and ‘safe’. The reality
of the NHS badge is far more complicated and needs
unpacking; what constitutes as ‘safety’ and the process-
es of ‘approval’ are not as clear or transparent as they
may first appear to be. First of all, inclusion in the
Library does not in fact automatically mean the apps
have already been approved. Having an app listed only
requires a simple five-step online application process;
any developer can put their app through on completion
of their Digital Assessment Questions, regardless of the
answers (!).31 Granted, some apps might be removed
after being tested, but they would still remain listed and
‘live’ (i.e. available to use) in the Library while under-
going the vetting process. Tellingly, at the time of our
data collection in summer 2018, out of the 49 apps
listed only one had the full NHS Approved badge;
four had partial approval, and three were in the process
of being tested. Secondly, the notion of ‘safety’ in the
verification process only partially includes the safety of
data. App assessment ensures that the app ‘meets NHS
quality standards for clinical effectiveness, safety,
usability and accessibility, and has evidence to support
its use’; the NHS assesses an app’s ‘safety’ according to
‘both clinical safety and information safety
(Information Governance, Privacy and Security)’.31
Safety, here, conjoins and conflates the notion
of health risk and data risk. But while the discourse
of ‘approval’/‘vetting’ institutionalises user trust via
safety scaffolding, supposedly built into the process
of verification, the idea of data safety and what it
might entail when bio data is aggregated and mined
by the apps, remains obscure. For example, do the
‘vetted’ apps report their data collection protocols to
the NHS? What about the third parties, with which the
apps share their users’ data? What is missing in this
narrative is a clear distinction between medical and
data safety, testing and vetting; and more urgently,
a transparent explanation regarding what kind of
different and separate process is involved in ‘approv-
ing’ medical safety and data safety of the apps.
Within such a changeable site where information on
app safety is both opaque and confusing, what are the
possibilities of opting out (for example, if a user realises
an app is not as ‘safe’ as it might appear)? The NHS
Apps Library does not provide information or guid-
ance about the possibilities of leaving the ‘unsafe’
(or the ‘safe’) apps, once they are installed and activat-
ed. The only place where opt-out is mentioned is
outside of the Library, on the new National data opt
out service by NHS Digital, which allows people to ‘opt
out of their confidential patient information being used
for research and planning’. The scheme replaces the
previous ‘type 2 opt-out’, which required NHS
Digital to refrain from sharing a patient’s confidential
information for purposes beyond their direct care.
Type 1 opt-out referred to requests for not sharing
one’s information beyond direct care, placed directly
with the GP and one’s local surgery.
Indexed under ‘Systems and Services’ and placed in
a long, alphabetised list alongside other medical and
administrative services within the NHS, information
on opting out is very difficult to find and complicated
to execute. Users must confront hurdles of clicking
through multiple pages, downloading and emailing
forms, or searching for alternatives. Such processes
would require digital literacy, time, patience and perse-
verance – a striking contrast to how opting in is usually
communicated in today’s digital environments, where
‘download’, ‘subscribe’ and ‘follow’ buttons are large,
immediate and consistently visible.
More importantly, there are no links between the
National data opt out service by NHS Digital and
the Apps Library: it is unclear whether the NHS digital
opt-out refers only to the information collected by GP
surgeries and hospitals, or extends to the health apps.
As we can see, there is a worrying gap between the
online NHS narrative of health app ‘safety’ and the
reality of data safety. But in order to truly understand
the sheer complexity, tensions and discrepancies
between legal frameworks – such as GDPR or patients’
rights – and the reality of data sharing in health app-
isation beyond the discursive levels of data and medical
‘safety’, we need to analyse the actual apps, and their
policies and practices more closely. Herein lies the
value of our toolkit, which we offer as part of an assess-
ment framework to be used alongside a more contex-
tual analysis of the legal and practical conditions that
surround health apps.
Methods
Our app assessment toolkit offers a way to evaluate,
separately and in relation to each other, the following
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elements: (1) the apps’ Terms and Conditions as pre-
sented on their platforms/websites and within the apps;
(2) the apps’ ‘permissions’ to access other data via one’s
phone and the tracking of data beyond the app itself;
and (3) the way an app handles an opt-out after instal-
lation and use. The toolkit was developed and tested
using three apparently ‘safe’ apps or apps that were, or
appeared to have been at the time of our research anal-
ysis, NHS-recommended by either appearing in the
NHS Apps Library, or by carrying an NHS-endorsed
badge within the Apple and Google app stores: Echo,32
Babylon Health (BH),7 and Pregnancy Tracker and
Baby App (PTBA).33 Echo is an NHS-developed pre-
scription management app, which was and continues to
be at the time of writing, listed in the NHS Apps
Library. BH is a UK-based GP consultation tool that
was initially listed in the NHS Apps Library; it has
since been removed though continues to be advertised
on Apple and Google app stores as allowing to ‘see an
NHS GP’, with links to the NHS Apps Library; and is
currently also hosted on the nhs.uk domain.34 PTBA is
an US-based pregnancy and foetal/baby tracking app,
which was never listed in the Library but described in
the app stores as containing ‘all health information
[that] is approved [and] . . . certified by the NHS
England Information Standard’.35
Once chosen, these apps were then subject to the
following steps over the course of 10 weeks:
• Installation on a Samsung Galaxy running Android
and an iPhone running iOS.
• Creation and active use of ‘dummy’ user profiles to
replicate real life conditions as much as possible.
• Installation and adaption of the open source Exodus
analytical tools for Android applications (an open
source auditing platform with multiple applications,
allowing detection of app/device behaviours that
may be infringing user privacy through ads, track-
ing, analytics and listening tools).36 For legal rea-
sons, such tracking is not currently possible for
iPhone iOS applications.37 (At the time of writing,
Apple’s proprietary iOS platform remains a locked
digital rights management system, where under the
United States DMCA 1201 Law, and European
Article 6 of the EUCD, bypassing it constitutes a
legal offence leading to imprisonment and a fine;
see Doctorow37): the Exodus CLI client for local
analysis, and Etip – the Exodus tracker investigation
platform.38
• Analysis of network traffic on each app by using the
Exodus proxy tool to record which external trackers
or third-party servers each app communicated with
when used (to determine what types of user data
were being collected, and which external third-
party servers the data was sent to).39
• Concurrent use of the open source Apktool40 to
investigate the source code and operating processes
of each Android app, to further identify any known
trackers (e.g. hidden Facebook and Google
Analytics or advertising bots) that might exist in
the source code of each app.
• Documenting each tracker or type of data requested,
and comparison of the findings with Exodus data
reports, paying particular attention to the third par-
ties with which the data was shared, such as Google
and Facebook.
• Deactivation of apps on both phones, noting the
potential ‘opt-out’ options, the steps needed to ter-
minate the account, and the relation between deac-
tivation of the app and withdrawal of the data
already collected.
Far from using the three apps as a ‘representative’
sample of a wide range of health apps, we approached
them as a testing ground to build our analytical toolkit
and related evaluation criteria, both discursive and
technical. What we present in the following section is
simultaneously an assessment of empirical evidence,
and a demonstration of the benefits and uses of our
toolkit for future research.
The toolkit
Assessing the apps’ Terms and Conditions
Since health apps operate in a field of conflicting legal
and social frameworks with regards to data rights and
safety, it is important to incorporate these frameworks
when assessing the apps’ legal communication. For the
first element of our toolkit, we integrated three distinct,
complementary sets of guidelines:
• Caldicott Principles used in the NHS for handling
identifiable patient information,41 which strictly reg-
ulate the process of collecting and storing such infor-
mation, yet do not refer to how the process is
communicated to the patients themselves. The
Principles require: justification of the purpose(s) of
collecting information; not using patient-identifiable
information unless it is necessary; using the mini-
mum necessary patient-identifiable information; lim-
iting access to patient-identifiable information on a
strict need-to-know basis; ensuring that everyone
with access to patient-identifiable information is
aware of their responsibilities; understanding and
complying with the law; and understanding that
the duty to share information can be as important
as the duty to protect patient confidentiality.
• GDPR, which regulates digital data and places a
much stronger emphasis on the clarity and
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transparency of communication to the users and
introduces the choice of opting out.
• Our own framework for digital disengagement that
places opt-out as a starting point of any assessment.
Combining the three, we propose that the following
criteria should be used for assessing health apps’ Terms
and Conditions:
1. What information is said to be collected?
2. How is data stored?
3. What is the app’s Privacy Policy?
4. Can patients request to see their data?
5. Is there an opt-out policy? What is included in it?
Applying our criteria to the three apps, we found
that the information for each varied greatly in length,
clarity and detail. For example, Echo and BH provided
minimal explanation about which data was collected,
how it was stored, and whether and with whom it might
be shared: Echo only stated that they kept the infor-
mation ‘confidential’, and BH stated that the informa-
tion would be shared with GPs and private insurance
providers. Neither offered an option to choose which
parts of their data the user may decide to share (or
not). PTBA, on the other hand, detailed how different
types of data (identifiable versus anonymised) were
stored and used, and offered an option for opting out
of sharing the data with ‘affiliates’ and partners.
The apps also differed substantially when it came to
‘Privacy Policy’: Echo was the only one offering infor-
mation on both GDPR and Caldicott in its policy. BH
and PTBC, on the other hand, stated that their data
was shared with third parties who have their own
policies. The responsibility here was placed on the
user, who was expected to make decisions about infor-
mation sharing at their own discretion. BH, in partic-
ular, called the users to carefully read those parties’
documentations: ‘These policies are the policies of
our third-party service providers. As such we do not
accept any responsibility or liability for these policies.’7
While the first three criteria refer to collecting, stor-
ing and sharing information in and by the apps,
we were also particularly interested in contexts where
the users may wish to take their data out of the apps –
whether by requesting access to it and/or by opting out.
Both of those steps seem to appear complicated, and in
some cases, impossible. Echo allowed withdrawal of
consent within a set time frame; PTBA stated that
one could opt out from marketing communications as
well as from sharing personal information with affili-
ates and third parties, and could contact the company
with requests to ‘review, correct, update, restrict or
delete’ personal information.42 BH, on the other
hand, did not allow any opt-out at all, apart from
receiving marketing materials. Finally, although our
apps allowed users to access their data, Echo and BH
charged a fee for any information request. At the same
time, these opt-out options applied only to new forms
of data collection. When a user opts out of certain
forms of data sharing, or deletes their account, infor-
mation that has already been obtained (including sen-
sitive data, such as fertility of HIV status) might remain
and will continue to be used by the app or the third
parties. For example, PTBA policy stated: ‘Please note
that if you opt out as described above, we will not be
able to remove your personal information from the
databases of our affiliates with which we have already
shared your information (i.e. as of the date that we
implement your opt-out request)’.42 BH’s Terms and
Conditions stated that not all data could be deleted
and thus in case of deactivation, some data will con-
tinue to be used, in anonymous forms, for research.
Most worryingly, it is unclear how this distinction
between ‘new’ and ‘already obtained’ data is applied
during transition periods. Requests to delete personal
information or deactivate an account are lengthy
(taking an average of 30 days) and conditional, and
no guidance is provided about the moment when the
data mining ceases.
Mapping apps’ data sharing practices
While analysing the health apps’ Terms and Conditions
reveals the sheer complexity and the conflicting nature
of the legal and social frameworks within which health
apps exist, it does not necessarily tell us how these frame-
work actually operate within the app environment itself.
Because apps are embedded in smartphones and operate
in connection to other phone features, it is crucial to
examine the app’s data behaviour in the device environ-
ment. Therefore, the second element of our toolkit
examines which data is collected and shared by the
apps via ‘permission’ requests and trackers, using what
can be described as a ‘track the tracker’ technique.
The meaning and purpose of ‘permission’ is
described by Android developer documentation as a
way to protect personal data when a user accesses an
app on their smartphone. While there are many differ-
ent levels and sub-levels of permission requests within
Android applications, for the purposes of this project,
we focused on the two most common protection levels
that affect the sharing of user data with third-party
apps: ‘normal’ and ‘dangerous’. ‘Normal’ permissions
cover areas where an app needs to access data or
resources outside of itself, ‘but where there is very
little risk to the user’s privacy or the operation of
other apps. For example, permission to set the time
zone is a normal permission’.43 ‘Dangerous’ permis-
sions require sensitive or private user information
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(such as phone and email contacts, or text messages),
or access to phone features such as camera or automat-
ic calling performed by the app without the user touch-
ing a dialler. To use a ‘dangerous’ permission, the app
must request agreement from the user when it first
runs: for example, by indicating that they accept the
Terms and Conditions or Privacy Policy. ‘Dangerous’
permissions can also be ‘malicious’ – a term commonly
used in the world of cybersecurity – meaning ‘exploit-
able’. These are permissions that are required for the
app to work, and can remain dormant without ever
being taken advantage of. However, if exploited by a
cybercriminal, ‘dangerous’ permissions make the user
and their data most vulnerable.44,45
Assessing our selected apps in relation to the
amount and type of ‘permissions’ they request demon-
strates that even when Terms and Conditions present
robust privacy policies, the apps themselves draw
excessive additional information, beyond the actual
purpose of the app for reasons which are neither
clear nor justified. Many of these – for example users’
geo locations, phone calls, text messages or phone
calls – access and share personal data in unclear and
obscure ways that are ethically dubious and can
compromise users’ privacy, human/citizen rights and
potentially breach GDPR regulations, as summarised
in Table 1 below.
To make matters worse, apps also contain a
substantial amount of trackers, mining data about
the way users use the app, and sharing data with
third-party analytics. What is particularly important
is to examine trackers and permissions in relation to
each other, through for example, the ‘track the tracker’
technique that we implemented with the help of Exodus
and Apktool. In order to communicate joint effects of
tracking permissions and data sharing, and to facilitate
a more comprehensive and nuanced analysis, we devel-
oped an interactive data visualisation tool.46 This tool
enables us to demonstrate the apps’ operation in the
smartphones that host them, and reveals ways in which
a single health app is embedded in the multi-platform
network of data mining and sharing. Figures 1–4 below
present screen shots of data output as tested on our
three apps.
Mapping and analysing permissions and tracking
together demonstrate the importance of addressing
not just the quantity but also the specific nature of
data tracking. For example, PTBA seems to share the
largest amount of data with the most trackers, while
Echo has the fewest permissions, and as such, may
seem less invasive. However, its permissions request
for ‘Access [to] Coarse Location’ feeds one of the most
‘leaky’ combinations of app trackers in terms of the
ways in which user data is documented, traded and
shared across social networks, and how and when it is
displayed. Like PTBA, Echo uses Facebook trackers,
most specifically, Facebook Login (to share login data
from the app with Facebook), Facebook Analytics
(tracking anonymised, though context and category/
theme-based data), Facebook Places (sharing location),
and Facebook Share (ability to share health data to
other contacts on Facebook). Among all the third-
party trackers we documented, the seemingly unassum-
ing tracker entitled ‘GoogleCrashlytics’ may be themost
problematic one. It was used by Echo and BH. In addi-
tion to reporting to developers whenever an app crashes,
or how many times it is used, GoogleCrashlytics allows
developers to advertise across various hidden advertis-
ing networks, some of which are potentially untraceable
beyond Facebook and Google adverts, but with whom
sensitive data might be shared.
Passing app data to third parties, cross-referencing
data with information from other apps on the phone
and combining it with behaviour mining via social
media analytics has extensive potential for indirect,
yet substantial, intrusion into users’ privacy and confi-
dentiality. One of the ways in which it happens is when
sensitive health-related adverts are offered to users
based on the app’s sharing of the information regard-
ing GP appointments, medical topics discussed via the
app, or prescriptions ordered. These adverts might be
particularly unwelcome when they ‘follow’ the user
outside the app, breaching what Nissenbaum47
describes as the ‘contextual integrity’ of personalised
and private data as it is shifted beyond its original (in
our case, health-related) sphere of user practice and
intention to become a means of digital surveillance.
Such ads can pop up on social media, Google, in
games or a general browsing, especially if the user’s
geolocation presents an opportunity. For example,
a user could be ordering a prescription for fertility
medication while out shopping, and depending on
their location, an advertising network might show
them where a pregnancy test kit might be purchased
without consideration of where and when a person
might be accessing those (at home, work, in a public
space, next to a family member), and what the impli-
cations of such out-of-app following might be. These
potentially unwelcome exposures can affect anyone
using a health app, but might be particularly problem-
atic in instances of HIV-related, mental health, or fer-
tility information, which is regarded by many as
extremely personal, and as such, is often ferociously
guarded. Sharing any health information to
Facebook contacts poses similar, if not graver, dangers.
When developing and testing our toolkit on the
three apps, we found a range of inappropriate data
behaviours, from vague, limited and unclear informa-
tion about the nature and purpose of data sharing –
that is, would it be shared with GPs? The NHS?
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Medical research? Private non-medical companies?
Which and for what purpose? – to potential direct vio-
lations of both the Caldicott and GDPR principles. As
we have demonstrated, such behaviours appeared in
various combinations in the three apps. Our aim, how-
ever, was not to determine which of the three did
‘better’ or ‘worse’, nor even to see whether the apps
aligned with user expectations, as understanding the
latter would require a separate study. Rather, our dis-
cussion points out that data violations is not a binary
category of compliance/non-compliance, but a contin-
uum. We propose that our toolkit might be particularly
useful to inform further studies of this continuum, on
which a larger number of studied apps could be placed.
Documenting the steps needed to delete an app and
withdraw data
One might argue that data collected via apps’ permis-
sions is given by users voluntarily; furthermore, it may
seem that users have a degree of control by withholding
certain permissions. However, this does not fully allow
an opt-out of data aggregation. Although it is possible
to restrict some permissions via the smartphone
Table 1. How ‘dangerous’ permissions can be exploited for ’malicious’ use by cybercriminals.
Permissions request What permission does
How permission can be exploited by
malicious cybercriminals
Read phone state and identity
(android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE)
(android.permission.CALL_PHONE)
Lets app know user is taking calls
or is connected to a network.
Gives app access to information
such as user’s phone number,
International Mobile Equipment
Identity (IMEI) number, and
other identifying information.
Apps often use this to identify
users without requiring more
sensitive information.
Information-stealing malicious apps
often target device and phone
information.
Access coarse and fine location
(android.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION)
(android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION)
Grants access to user’s exact loca-
tion through the Global
Positioning System (GPS), cell
sites and Wi-Fi. App developers
can gain profit from location-
based ads.
The app can know where a user is at all
times.
Malicious cybercriminals can hack an
app and use these permissions to load
location-based attacks or malware, or
let burglars know when a user is far
away from home.
Full Internet access
(android.permission.INTERNET)
Apps can connect to the Internet. Malicious apps use the Internet to com-
municate with their command centres
or download updates and addition-
al malware.
Modify/delete SD card contents
(android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE)
This lets apps write on external
storage, like SD cards.
Cybercriminals use this to store copies of
stolen information or save files onto a
user’s SD card before sending them to
a command centre. Malicious apps
can also delete photos and other
personal files on a user’s SD card.
Camera
(android.permission.CAMERA)
This lets the app use your phone to
take photos and record videos at
any moment.
Cybercriminals can use this feature as a
visual recording device to take pic-
tures/videos of targeted parties (e.g.
general users/celebrities/politicians)
Record audio
(android.permission.RECORD_AUDIO)
An app can record ALL of a user’s
conversations. Not only when a
user is speaking on the phone,
but all day long.
Cybercriminals can use this feature as a
listening device to record conversa-
tions of targeted parties (e.g. general
users/celebrities/politicians).
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Figure 2. Echo app: User trackersþ app permission requests.
Figure 1. Babylon Health app: User trackersþ app permission requests.
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Figure 4. Babylon Health, Echo and Pregnancy Tracker & Baby App apps: Collective user tracking and permissions requests.
Figure 3. Pregnancy Tracker & Baby App: User trackersþ app permission requests.
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settings, when going back to the app, the user receives
warnings that core features are no longer accessible,
and restoration of permissions is required for the app
to function properly. The other option is to discontin-
ue/uninstall the app entirely. However, as both our
evaluation of Terms and Conditions and the tracking
of the apps’ sharing and storage capabilities suggest,
removing the app does not necessarily stop the data
aggregation and mining, or does so only partially.
The final component of our toolkit is therefore dedi-
cated to documenting the step-by-step process of
opting out, according to the following criteria:
1. How easy it is to do so within the app?
2. How long does the process take?
3. What are the types of data one can or cannot opt
out of?
Of the three apps, Echo offered the most clear and
streamlined process, where the deletion of an account
was accompanied by clearly labelled screens from
within the app (see figures 5–6). Echo was also most
clear and transparent about the time frame of the pro-
cess, and the totality of deletion. After asking the user
to confirm that they did indeed want to delete their
data, Echo followed through by informing the user
that within the GDPR advised ‘reasonable’ period for
deleting user data’, it aimed to remove all the user’s
data at their request, within 30 days.
The other two apps (BH and PTBA) were far less
straightforward. PTBA, for example, did not provide
an easy way for the user to opt out of sharing their
data, despite having detailed (albeit contradictory)
information on opt-out options in their Terms and
Conditions. When attempting to delete the account,
the user was directed to the ‘FAQ’ link, accessible via
Figure 5. Echo app: deleting the account. Figure 6. Echo app: deleting the account.
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the ‘More’ menu; however the only opt-out option
available was to remove the baby registered for devel-
opment monitoring, as part of the app’s use. Instead of
having the option to delete their account or opt out of
sharing their data, users had to resort to: ‘10. My ques-
tion about the app isn’t answered here. Where can I get
more help?’, which guided them to contact the UK
support services to discuss alternatives (Figure 7).35
Similarly, despite having a clearly presented Privacy
Policy, BH offered no direct way of opting out of
data sharing, or deleting the account entirely from
within the app. Again, one needed to go through a
similar ‘Help’ option in the ‘Settings’ menu only to be
redirected to the app’s website (Figure 8) for informa-
tion on cancelling different subscription levels, and the
account itself. Worryingly, as of 12 July 2018, despite
the implementation of the GDPR, BH still incorpo-
rates the less thorough Data Protection Act 1998 in
terms of handling requests for cancellation.
In neither case was the time frame for the process
clear, nor was there a guarantee of which data would
be removed.
Our assessment of BH’s and PTBA’s opting out
procedures suggests that these are made cumbersome-
by-design, whether on a practical interface level or in
terms of legal specificities. The labour and responsibil-
ity of finding a way out is placed on the user: in the case
of BH, the user was required to navigate numerous
‘Help’ screens, and individually cancel each aspect of
their membership/use/subscription to the different
services within the app. In the case of PTBA there
was no direct way of removing the data from within
the app. Instead, the user had to read through lengthy
pages of the Terms and Conditions and Privacy Policy
that had been set out to cover both the app and the
website communities used by users. Subsequently, the
user had to fill in a form where the only choice for
opting out of sharing one’s data was to choose the
Figure 7. PTBA app: No direct opt-out from app. Figure 8. Babylon app: Deleting the account.
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drop-down selection, ‘Data protection questions’, and
then try to explain in a free text form that they would
like to have their data removed. The user was also
made responsible for looking into any third-party
apps the PTBA software may have shared the data
with, and extricate it accordingly. All these tasks
require a high degree of technical knowledge and
legal literacy, which most users do not possess. In
other words, neither having rigorous Terms and
Conditions nor providing a clear interface options are
sufficient, on their own, to facilitate a straightforward
and readily available opt-out process. While email sup-
port or a ‘delete your account’ button within an app
may promise an easy fix, the reality of opting out of
data, once a person has started using the app, is com-
plicated and uncertain.
Conclusion
Our analysis of health appisation in the UK reveals the
currently heightened national concerns over personal
data management within the context of GDPR and
the wider changes in European data policies. One
could argue that the move to become ‘GDPR-compli-
ant’ is a step towards data justice and increased digital
rights of users/patients, where opting out is becoming
institutionalised. Yet a closer look at how such compli-
ancy is being implemented – not just through everyday
practices, but also at a more granular and algorithmic
level of health apps – reveals a fluid and complex web
of networked ‘data traps’ that act as resource nodes of
biodata. These ever-changing and often contradictory
settings in the contemporary UK–European socio-
economic, legal and political landscape rely on their
data subjects to be digitally engaged, or (un)willing
participants in the process of the digitisation and app-
isation of health. Practices and technologies of opting
out struggle to find a place within such a context that is
simultaneously part of the global capitalist data econ-
omy where opt-out rights are diminishing and personal
data is shared easily, and is subject to new data protec-
tion regulation that places opt-out rights at its centre.
Emerging directly from conflicting civil, clinical and
corporate frameworks surrounding personal data
usage is a further tension that manifests very specifi-
cally within the area of digital health. The process of
appisation, which is based on having an individual
gadget and an individual account to support one’s
needs, signals the increasing self-responsibilisation of
health: self-care, self-management, self-tracking and
self-monitoring.5,48–52 On the one hand, then, digital
health is about the individual, where responsibility
and accountability of one’s own health now includes
responsibility for one’s own personal data; as we have
shown throughout our analysis, the onus of finding,
safeguarding, accepting, refusing, and figuring ways
out is always on the individual user. Furthermore, the
management of one’s data is often presented with an
illusion of choice. This is particularly apparent in how
the NHS Apps Library interpellates the ‘you’ and the
‘self’53 in practices such as accepting Terms and
Conditions, or in granting app permissions, not to
mention the very decision to choose and install an
app – the epitome of agentic ‘consumer choice’.54–56
On the other hand, as our ‘tracking the tracker’ tech-
nique has consistently demonstrated, health apps bring
a radically new level of data powerlessness. When
health information is shared, and jointly mined, with
a search/advertising engine (Google) or a social net-
working site (Facebook), the idea of ‘doctor–patient
confidentiality’ becomes all but a symbolic gesture
from bygone days. Health appisation gives rise to algo-
rithmic ‘care’, one based on analytics that might be
more efficient, speedy and precise yet also relentlessly
intrusive and non-private, where no medical informa-
tion is left untouched, unseen, undisclosed.
Crucially, the broad and extensive sharing of our
personal (bio)data for analytics and profit means that
opting out, or the use, of health apps is first and fore-
most about large-scale dataisation and the economy of
surveillance capitalism.57 While data management
practices are individual, and targeted advertising is
also individually tailored, the individual is meaningless
in the eyes of algorithmic determinism and prediction.
A single user’s data has no representative value: mon-
etary and statistic capital lies with the aggregated Big
Data. It is at this tension that the digitisation of health
lies, between the neoliberal model of the individual
whose health and data concerns are personalised into
the ‘Self’, and the digital-capitalist model,58–61 which
generates value from the collective, and is thus repre-
sentationally and statistically ‘valid’ – the data of the
masses. It is here that we witness what Btihaj Ajana
coined the shift ‘from individual data to communal
data, from the Quantified Self to the ‘Quantified Us’,
from the ‘biopolitics of the self’ to the biopolitics of the
population’49 (p. 14).
Within such a context, ‘opting out’ is pulled across
oppositional forces: it is a matter of individual rights
(and responsibilities), while also, paradoxically, situat-
ed within a system that supports, and capitalises on,
mass value and mass data. Legal changes such as the
GDPR are undoubtedly a welcome and much needed
attempt to protect individual rights in the world of
large-scale data sharing, mining and profiling. Yet,
in addition to exploitable legal loopholes (such as the
out-of-app Terms and Conditions) within supposedly
GDPR-compliant apps there are also technical loop-
holes (as we have seen through various ‘permissions’
pinned to optimal app functionality) that work
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together in complicit ways that endanger the individu-
al. The combination of legal and technical loopholes
needs to be exposed and amended, because herein a
more substantial issue is at stake in relation to the
effectiveness of legal frameworks such as GDPR.
When the digital data economy traffics in Big Data,
and when, as a result, individual data ownership
erodes in favour of ‘data philanthropy’ – a growing
shift towards ‘surrendering’ one’s data for the ‘public
good’, where unwillingness to share and concerns for
privacy are seen as ‘selfish and anti-solidaristic’49 (p.
11) – legally addressing individual responsibility and
individual protection is not enough, and will never be
fully efficient. How, then, can we approach, analyse
and change the current landscape of the ‘socio-cultural
data traps’ of health apps?
First and foremost, we require a further, more exten-
sive and more nuanced understanding, mapping and
monitoring of the dataised operation of health apps.
This is where we see the main methodological and prac-
tical impact and value of our proposed toolkit, offered
here for further development and use by others, in both
social research and healthcare provision. While we
tested and developed our toolkit in the UK, its key
principles can be rescaled and adjusted to use else-
where. The power of our toolkit is twofold: it allows
the identification of loopholes and ‘vulnerabilities by
design’ within the apps, as well as fleshing out discrep-
ancies between data policies and data practices.
Only when we can ‘see’ the differences between the
individualised discourse of health apps as they present
themselves, and the inner workings of data extraction,
can we begin to understand the complexities of digital
health’s data traps. The open source platforms we used
are widely available and in themselves are not new. But
it is in using them in conjunction with the discursive
analyses of the apps’ websites and their Terms and
Conditions and of the institutional socio-legal frame-
works in operation, that one can begin to build a fuller
picture and understanding of what the digitisation and
appisation of health entails, and how it operates on
both an individual and collective level.
Secondly, we must also rethink the idea of ‘data
rights’ in digital health, by shifting towards the
perspective of data justice, and this is where we see
our article’s main theoretical contribution to the field
of critical digital health scholarship. By introducing
opt-out as a conceptual lens and as a starting point of
our critical inquiry, we are calling to denaturalise digital
engagement itself when discussing the relations between
health and everyday communication technologies. Our
proposed paradigmatic shift towards digital dis-engage-
ment should not be understood as a call to abandon all
apps or other digital technologies, or turn towards tech-
nologically free healthcare. Rather, we offer a way for a
critical and sceptical assessment of health apps – and
more broadly, of other digital communication technol-
ogies – as they are being introduced and adopted,
beyond their clinical effectiveness or their potential to
save human resources in healthcare. Such assessment
must include, but also go beyond, individualised solu-
tions such as raising awareness or legally protecting indi-
vidual user’s rights. In order to create a space for both
individual rights to refuse to be part of a database,14 and
a more systemic, collective refusal of ‘biopolitical cate-
gorisations that are enabled through Big Data practi-
ces’49 (p. 13), we need to move away from the
biopolitics of commodification to a true commitment
to health and care. To do that, opting out needs to be
our ethical anchor and our starting point.
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